The Case for a European Senate. A model for the representation of national parliaments in the European Union by Gerhard van der Schyff & Gert-Jan Leenknegt
ZÖR 62 (2007), 237–258
DOI 10.1007/s00708-007-0177-2
© Springer-Verlag 2007
Printed in The Netherlands
Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht
The Case for a European Senate.  
A model for the representation of national 
parliaments in the European Union
Gerhard van der Schyff and Gert-Jan Leenknegt, Tilburg*
 I. Introduction
 II. From double to triple democratic legitimation
 III. Senates in general
 IV. Characterisation of senates
 V. Powers of a European senate
 VI. Composition of a European senate
 VII. Conclusion
Keywords: European Senate; European Union; European Constitution; South African National 
Council of Provinces; comparative federalism; comparative constitutional law; bicameralism; 
democratic legitimacy; democratic deficit.
Legal provisions: German Basic Law (1949); Indian Constitution (1950); South African Con-
stitution (1996); Treaty Establishing the European Community; Treaty Establishing a Con-
stitution for Europe.
I. Introduction
The troublesome ratification process of the Treaty Establishing a Constitu-
tion for Europe (Constitutional Treaty) has laid bare the undeniable fact that 
European integration is going too far, and too fast, for a large part of the 
European population. In this regard it is often said that the European Union 
(EU) suffers from a democratic deficit – integration moves ahead while lack-
ing democratic legitimacy.
* Lecturer and Senior Lecturer respectively, Department of Constitutional and Admin-
istrative Law, Faculty of Law, Tilburg University, The Netherlands.
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In addressing this problem the plea for strengthening the role of na-
tional parliaments within the EU has gained popularity in recent years.1 
Members of national parliaments should be better informed on European 
policy, and parliaments should be involved in the policy-making process at 
Community level at an early stage, so that they would be able to play a much 
more active and leading role. This, in turn, would lead to a greater under-
standing and involvement among citizens, and to the strengthening of Eu-
ropean democracy. Various suggestions have been made in this regard, in-
cluding to explicitly grant national parliaments ‘the subsidiarity test’ regard-
ing EU legislative proposals, as laid down in the First and Second Protocol 
attached to the Constitutional Treaty, as well as to make the European Com-
mission accountable to national parliaments. Voices are also heard advocating 
the creation of an additional chamber, a ‘European Senate’, next to the Eu-
ropean Parliament representing national parliaments.2 
In this contribution we wish to state the case for introducing one such 
proposal, namely a senate, as we believe that this would increase the Union’s 
democratic vitality, thereby making a dent in the democratic deficit it expe-
riences at present. The attention is first turned to exploring the EU’s demo-
cratic legitimacy, after which the focus falls on characterising the composi-
tion and competence of a possible senate. Other suggestions on the strength-
ening of national parliaments within the EU will also be discussed and 
highlighted, where apt, to illustrate their relation to a senate.
II. From double to triple democratic legitimation
Democracy in its purest form means that the people should govern them-
selves. In other words, citizens participate directly in the taking of political 
decisions that concern them. Those governed and their governors are thus one 
1 Cf Niblock, The EEC: National Parliaments in Community Decision-Making (1971); 
Weber-Panariello, Nationale Parlamente in der Europäischen Union (1995); Laursen/Pappas 
(eds), The Changing Role of Parliaments in the European Union (EIPA 1995); Smith (ed), 
National Parliaments as Cornerstones of European Integration (1996); Maurer/Wessels (eds), 
National Parliaments on Their Ways to Europe: Losers or Latecomers (2001); Kiiver, The 
National Parliaments in the European Union (2005).
2 The creation of a senate was first proposed in 1953, the failure of the European Defence 
Community put paid to any such plans. Calls have been made at various intervals since then 
for the creation of an additional legislative chamber, such as that in 1989 by former British 
Deputy Prime Minister Michael Heseltine, and more recently by former French Prime Minister 
Jospin, former German Foreign Minister Fischer and British Prime Minister Blair regarding 
the need for an extra body to be created in order to represent national parliaments. Cf A 
Second Parliamentary Chamber for Europe, Seventh Report by the EU Select Committee of 
the House Lords (2001); A European Second Chamber, Report by the French Senate (1999); 
Kiiver, The National Parliaments in the European Union (note 1) 127–128, for overviews and 
discussions.
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and the same, thereby lending legitimacy to the exercise of power and author-
ity. This ideal is, however, all but possible in the smallest and most simple 
of societies. Large and complicated societies have to dilute this link between 
the governed and their governors for the sake of expediency. Democracy, in 
real terms, is therefore not so much direct as it is indirect. People are governed 
by representatives who are given a mandate to legislate and decide on behalf 
of the majority, instead of requiring the people to take all decisions them-
selves. This is especially true, and necessary, where the EU is concerned – as 
was also recognised in the Constitutional Treaty.3 Traditionally representa-
tive democracy in the EU rests on two pillars, or what can been termed 
double legitimacy.4 The first pillar being the Council of the European Union 
(Council of Ministers), as the voice of national governments; and the second 
pillar being the European Parliament, as the elected voice of all Europeans. 
Although representative democracy is indeed an EU premise, it is in 
danger of being diluted to a mere slogan. An entity as large and complex as 
the EU is often accused of negating the link between the governed and those 
who are entrusted with governing them. As a matter of fact, increased frus-
tration has been brewing against this form of representative democracy for a 
number of years, if not from the very beginning.5 
The process of European governance and integration is seen as first and 
foremost a concern of the European political elite and national govern-
ments. National parliaments are mostly observant and react instead of act, 
while the average citizen is, at best, hardly interested, or plainly negative 
towards Europe. The gap between the citizen and the national state opens 
into an even deeper and wider chasm regarding Brussels. The EU is widely 
associated with expensive bureaucracy, a tendency to produce petty regula-
tions on any conceivable subject, a lack of transparency and democratic 
control, and the loss of political and economic autonomy to the advantage 
of new member states. In this view, European integration is an autonomous 
and uncontrollable process, propelled by an unknown force. Such negative 
perceptions of the state of European democracy are only fuelled by charges 
that the European Parliament cannot effectively monitor other EU organs 
to the extent that the legislative function of the Council of Ministers actu-
ally escapes proper control and lacks a counter-weight. This only enhances 
the power of governments working through it while placing the role of leg-
islators on the backburner.6 Concerns have also been voiced that the Euro-
3 Art I-45, I-46 of the Constitutional Treaty. 
4 Barents, Een Grondwet voor Europa (2005) 21.
5 Cf Blondel/Sinnott/Svensson, People and Parliament in the European Union: Participation, 
Democracy and Legitimacy (1998) 2–4, who argue that the European Community was always 
organised in an elitist manner, that saw democratic elements introduced here and there to 
keep the process within vague democratic parameters. 
6 Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (2002) 79.
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pean Parliament has not assumed the powers transferred by national parlia-
ments to national governments when it comes to Europe.7 In other words, 
executive power is thus quite strongly represented at European level, but 
this is not counter-balanced by legislative control, thereby removing Eu-
rope even further from Europeans. The vision that national parliaments had 
to control their governments when it comes to EU matters has also come 
under pressure, as much as the idea that EU institutions had to be control-
led by the European Parliament. For instance, national parliaments have on 
the whole been quite slow and reluctant to scrutinise Community develop-
ments ever since moves to European integration started in the 1950’s.8 Ex-
ecutive wisdom in charting the future of Europe cannot substitute the need 
for democratic legitimacy.
To be fair though, the Community initially took decisions by consensus 
and enjoyed relatively limited competence. As national sovereignty was not 
threatened, so did populations and national parliaments not act. This how-
ever gradually changed with moves towards greater integration. Not only 
was the Community’s power growing, but national governments could be 
outvoted in the Council of Ministers. National unease only increased after 
the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986.9 The first major revision 
of the Treaty of Rome that extended qualified majority voting to more areas, 
formalised European Political Cooperation and saw the goal set of a single 
market by 1993. As with most things, every action is met by a reaction. 
‘More Europe’ led to calls for more democratic control of Community em-
powerment. A need, as explained, not always met by the European Parlia-
ment.10 Interestingly, even though the European Parliament has been di-
rectly elected since 1979, citizens increasingly sceptical of integration iden-
tified more with national parliaments – a situation somewhat contradictory 
to the Tindemans Report that in 1975 viewed direct elections as a panacea for 
the Community’s legitimacy ills. A case of favouring national institutions 
7 Cf Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (note 6) 79; Jurgens, A Federal Option 
for the European Community or a Permanent Democratic Deficit, in Flinterman/Heringa/Wad-
dington (eds), The Evolving role of National Parliaments (1994) 85–86; Gustavsson, Preserve 
or Abolish the Democratic Deficit, in Smith (ed), National Parliaments as Cornerstones of 
European Integration (1996) 100–123.
8 Raunio/Wiberg, Does Support Lead to Ignorance? National Parliaments and the Legiti-
macy of EU Governance, Acta Politica 2002, 147–148; Norton, National Parliaments in 
Western Europe, in Smith (ed), National Parliaments as Cornerstones of European Integration 
(1996) 22–23.
9 Raunio/Wiberg, Does Support Lead to Ignorance? National Parliaments and the Legiti-
macy of EU Governance (note 8) 147; Kiiver, The National Parliaments in the European 
Union (note 1) 14; Norton, National Parliaments in Western Europe (note 8) 23–27; Smith, 
EU Legitimacy and the ‘Defensive’ Reaction to the Single European Market, in Banchoff/Smith 
(eds), Legitimacy and the European Union: The Contested Polity (1999) 27–45.
10 Blondel/Sinnott/Svensson, People and Parliament in the European Union: Participation, 
Democracy and Legitimacy (note 5) 4.
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with an indirect role, but closer to home as it were, to a directly elected 
European institution perceived as remote. This contradiction served as the 
catalyst in elevating the role and status of national parliaments in Commu-
nity matters, both on a national and European level. At national level, for 
example, a number of constitutions, notably those of Germany, Portugal and 
France, were amended to increase the role fulfilled by national parliaments 
in scrutinising European legislation. With a similar courtship taking place 
at European level since the early 1990’s, as highlighted in the introduction 
and elaborated on below. A clear indication that all is not well with the state 
of the EU’s democratic legitimation, while the key may lie in rethinking the 
role of national parliaments.
As a matter of fact, it may be questioned whether the traditional approach 
of double legitimacy is not to be replaced by triple legitimacy. In other words, 
formal recognition of national parliaments as the third and direct mainstay of 
European democracy. Instead of often little more than implying a role for 
national parliaments at European level, and an indirect role at that, while 
viewing the Council of Ministers and European Parliament as the EU’s main 
democratic actors. This question warrants attention, as double legitimacy 
simply amounts to a vanguard action that still fails to ‘bring democracy 
home’, a point well stressed by popular antagonism at the Constitutional 
Treaty culminating in its referenda defeats in France and the Netherlands.11 
The time has come to shed the paternalist traits that have shadowed the 
Community ever since its inception and that often sees citizen consultation 
as a ‘necessary evil’ as it were.12 The European project is too important not 
to consult and heed the very Europeans it seeks to benefit.
By extending the base on which democratic legitimacy rests along the 
line of triple legitimacy, the bond between citizens and their rulers could be 
strengthened. It is in this context that the introduction of a senate must be 
understood and evaluated. Namely, as an instrument that seeks to enhance 
representative democracy by consolidating the role of national parliaments, 
thereby winning ground on the EU’s democratic deficit in the quest for le-
gitimacy. But what is meant by a senate, what should it do and what should 
it look like? These questions are addressed below.
III. Senates in general
The term ‘senate’ covers a broad variety of institutions. Even within the bi-
cameral parliamentary systems in the EU, many differences can be found with 
11 Cf Nijeboer, The Dutch Referendum, 1 European Constitutional Law Review 2005, 
393–405. 
12 Blondel/Sinnott/Svensson, People and Parliament in the European Union: Participation, 
Democracy and Legitimacy (note 5) 3.
G. van der Schyff and G.-J. Leenknegt242
respect to the functions, composition, and powers of institutions called ‘sen-
ate’.13 The senate is therefore an institution which ‘eludes uniform charac-
terization’.14 Nevertheless, we must attempt to sketch the most important 
functions of senates, as the function a senate has in a certain political system 
is decisive, both for its manner of composition, and for the powers it should 
have. Subsequently, we will relate these functions to our discussion of a Eu-
ropean Senate.
The cardinal question in this regard is, what is the raison d’être of the sen-
ate in political systems? Essentially, senates function as an instrument with 
which to legitimate political power. However, this is done by senates provid-
ing an additional form or route of representation to the usual or current means 
of representation. This is why senates are often referred to as ‘second cham-
bers’, as they augment the existing or primary chamber in legitimating the 
exercise of power. In providing such representation senates usually defend 
particular interest groups, such as social or geographical units, and are called 
upon to co-decide the desirability or quality of legislative proposals in order 
to strengthen the political process. In short, senates serve to add legitimacy 
to a system by broadening its base of representation and checking power in 
order to increase the system’s support or stability. 
For example, traditionally senates were constructed in some older Euro-
pean democracies as a bulwark or stronghold of the Throne.15 In those cases, 
the loyal and conservative nobility, often appointed to the senate by the King 
himself, served to protect the King and his government against an overzeal-
ous lower house, governed by unrest and excitement. In those systems, the 
senate served mainly to protect the interests of the King and of the aristoc-
racy against the lower house. However, due to the democratisation of parlia-
ments in Europe in the course of the 19th century, which affected not only 
the lower houses, but also most senates, the role of senates has taken on a 
decidedly democratic flavour.
Senates are no longer the preserve of the privileged classes in adding their 
voice when it comes to legitimating political power.16 More often nowadays 
senates serve to represent the interests of sub-states within federations. As a 
matter of fact, one could say that ‘bicameralism seems to be inherent to 
13 Cf Groß, Zwei-Kammer-Parlamente in der Europäischen Union, 63 Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffenliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2003) 32–50.
14 Blom, Bicameralism – History – Theory – Problems, in Blom/Blockmans/de Schepper (eds), 
Bicameralisme: Tweekamerstelsel Vroeger en Nu (1992) 19. Cf Russell, Reforming the House 
of Lords (1999) 19–44.
15 Couwenberg, Bicameralism – Historical Background, Alternative Conceptions and Cur-
rent Relevance, in Blom/Blockmans/de Schepper (eds), Bicameralisme: Tweekamerstelsel Vroeger 
en Nu (1992) 139–140. 
16 With the exception of some chambers that still incorporate hereditary appointments, 
such as the House of Lords in the United Kingdom. Cf Russell, Reforming the House of Lords 
(note 14) 30. 
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federalism’.17 In federations, senates provide a crucial second line of legiti-
macy to the political process. They help to strengthen the unity of the fed-
eration as they ensure the commitment of sub-state governments to federal 
policy, and, at the same time, are the expression of the autonomy of sub-states 
within the union. The classic example being the United States Senate that 
acts as a powerful voice in checking the power of the House of Representa-
tives and giving sub-states a voice at federal level. Related to this federal 
aspect is the discussion on the meaning of bi-cameralism in view of modern 
multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies.18 Even without a federal or strong-
ly decentralised structure, a senate can still provide a platform for the spe-
cific interests of ethnic groups, as opposed to the general national interests 
on which the lower house generally focuses.19 In other words, senates can 
serve to represent geographical or social units. These may of course also 
overlap, as a particular territory, such as Wallonia in Belgium, may coincide 
with a particular identity or language.20
Currently, the function of a senate is increasingly linked to the need for 
precise and careful deliberation of bills and other parliamentary decisions.21 
The task of a senate is to reconsider decisions taken by the government and 
the lower house from a more detached and non-political viewpoint. An argu-
ment related to this ‘reflection’-theory concentrates on the monistic relation 
between the cabinet and the majority in the lower house that is often found 
in parliamentary systems. This monism can lead to a disregard of necessary 
parliamentary control over the government. Senates usually have a more 
dualistic stance against the government, and can consequently provide the 
necessary control over government more easily.
But where does this all leave national parliaments and the EU? Well, a 
senate would arguably be the ideal vehicle with which to realise triple 
 legitimacy, as explained under the previous heading. A senate could function 
as a ‘house of national parliaments’ in providing a source of representation 
and legitimation within the EU in addition to the Council of Ministers and 
17 Blom, Bicameralism – History – Theory – Problems (note 14) 30;  Couwenberg, Bicam-
eralism – Historical Background, Alternative Conceptions and Current Relevance (note 15) 
139–146; Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries (1999) 203.
18 Cf Couwenberg, Bicameralism – Historical Background, Alternative Conceptions and 
Current Relevance (note 15) 143. 
19 E.g. s. 331 of the Indian Constitution (1950) provides that the President may, if he is 
of opinion that the Anglo-Indian community is not adequately represented in the Lok Sabha 
(the second chamber), nominate not more than two members of that community to it. 
Thereby ensuring adequate ethnic representation of Anglo-Indians. 
20 Cf Craenen, Belgium, General Background and Legal Characteristics, in Craenen (ed), 
The Institutions of Federal Belgium: An Introduction to Belgian Public Law2 (2001) 23–
24.
21 Russell, Reforming the House of Lords (note 14) 21–22.
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European Parliament. A senate would be a prime means of aggregating the 
interests of and giving a voice to national parliaments, thereby ensuring an 
extra avenue of value articulation and democratic control when it comes to 
European affairs. In essence, its prime function would be to increase the EU’s 
democratic input and broaden its base of appeal by housing national institu-
tions as building blocks of its legitimacy.
However, having addressed a senate’s general function, questions remain 
though as to the closer characterisation of its scope, and its relation to other 
legislative chambers. Only having addressed these questions can a clearer 
picture be given of the added value of a senate, especially in the European 
context.
IV. Characterisation of senates
Senates have always met with criticism, to the extent that some countries 
have discussed the abolition of their senates, the Netherlands and Belgium 
for example. Some countries did actually abolish their senates, such as Den-
mark and Sweden after the Second World War.22 Most of the criticism ad-
dressed to senates concerns the alleged unnecessary repetition of procedures. 
When the cabinet and the lower house have agreed, often after lengthy de-
bates, on a complicated compromise, the senate starts all over again to 
evaluate the problem at hand for a second time, usually adding no new sig-
nificant insights to the matter. In that view, senates are simply a retarding 
element in the political process. On the other hand, senates are politically 
more independent from the government than their respective lower houses, 
which creates room for an independent judgement of matters. But when they 
do take a position which diverges from that of the lower house too often, 
they run the risk of being called ‘obstructionist’. 
Whether a senate can be criticised for being an unnecessary, retarding or 
even obstructionist element within the political system of course depends 
upon its composition and powers. When both houses of parliament have a 
similar or even identical basis of legitimacy – such as direct popular election 
– the need for reconsideration of bills and other decisions by a senate will be 
contested more easily. A senate will then simply be accused of amounting to 
needless duplication of an existing method of legitimation. In other words, 
a senate which has an apparent added value will be less sensitive to criticism. 
Thus, composing a senate by different means than the lower house will add 
to its value, as it brings an alternative means of legitimacy to the process. 
Lijphart calls this congruence.23 The more congruent chambers, the more 
22 Russell, Reforming the House of Lords (note 14) 23. 
23 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries (note 17) 207; Knippenberg, De Senaat: Rechtsvergelijkend Onderzoek naar het 
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similar their composition, and the more incongruent the more dissimilar 
their composition.
Not only must senates, in order to be justified, add value as to their com-
position but also as to their powers. This is however a topic that lends to 
great controversy and division. For example, senates which have the power 
to reject bills without such rejection being subject to an override, or at least 
have the power to suspend them for a considerable period of time, will be 
more easily accused of impeding the political process than a weak senate 
which has little or no powers to do so. Yet, it makes very little sense, apart 
from window-dressing, to create a weak senate which is little more than a 
puppet or rubberstamp. Lijphart calls this symmetry.24 The more alike the 
powers of a senate in relation to the lower house the more symmetrical the 
relationship, and the other way round.
Bi-cameral legislatures are then classified along a spectrum based on their 
congruence of composition and symmetry of power.25 For example, it is usually ar-
gued that strong bi-cameralism is found when a senate is incongruent and 
symmetrical, or nearly, in relation to the lower house.26 In other words, its 
composition differs from that of the lower house, but it is as powerful as the 
lower house. Bi-cameralism is therefore a strong and vivid reality, as the 
chambers enjoy different bases of legitimation, but possess evenly matched 
powers. Medium-strength bi-cameralism implies that the senate is congruent 
and symmetrical in relation to the lower house.27 Not only are their powers 
matched, but so too their composition, leading to a troublesome duplication 
of legitimacy. Medium-strength bi-cameralism is also to be noted when a senate 
is asymmetrical and incongruent.28 Not only is its composition then quite 
different from that of the lower house, but so too its powers. In other words, 
there is no duplication of legitimation, but the senate lacks somewhat in 
power. Whereas weak bi-cameralism is noted when a senate is composed 
similarly to its lower house, but guaranteed far less power – not only dupli-
cation of legitimation, but also less punch, as it were.29
House of Lords, de Sénat, de Eerste Kamer en de Bundesrat (Sdu Uitgevers 2002) 3. Cf 
 Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One 
Countries (1984).
24 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries (note 17) 206; Knippenberg, De Senaat: Rechtsvergelijkend Onderzoek naar het 
House of Lords, de Sénat, de Eerste Kamer en de Bundesrat (note 23) 3.
25 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries (note 17) 212.
26 E.g. Australia, Germany, Switzerland, United States. These, as well as the examples 
mentioned below, are taken from Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and 
Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (note 17) 212.
27 E.g. Belgium, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands. 
28 E.g. Canada, France, India, Spain, Venezuela. 
29 E.g. Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Ireland, Jamaica.
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Again, the question can be posed as to where this leaves national parlia-
ments and the EU? The classification of senates according to their congruence 
and symmetry can obviously be useful in plotting and discussing the concept 
of a European Senate. These terms will then also be used in discussing the 
ideal powers and composition of such a body below. However, caution must 
be sounded in simply transplanting notions of strong to weak bi-cameralism 
to a European Senate. This is because such a body would function in a supra-
national and multi-level environment, as opposed to a national environment, the 
former being quite often different in form and theory to the latter.30 A Eu-
ropean Senate would also form part of what can at best be described as a 
multi-cameral structure,31 and not the usual bi-cameral structure on which the 
classification rests of senates being strong to weak. In other words, a Euro-
pean Senate must be justified and designed with a number of bodies in mind, 
and not only a lower house.
Yet, lessons may be drawn from senates in bi-cameral systems. For instance, 
incongruence as to its composition can be taken as desirable, in order to ensure 
that a senate provides an additional and different form of legitimacy, thereby 
adding value. It also to be remarked that a toothless senate would be more 
than undesirable, in other words there should be an effective measure of sym-
metry, but not so as to obstruct the political process. Ultimately the question 
is what constitutes an effective and worthwhile senate? Notions of strong and 
weak senates must be evaluated against this background, while still being 
sensitive to the European situation. This is precisely what is attempted below. 
The discussion will first turn to the powers of a European Senate, after which 
its composition will be discussed in this light.
V. Powers of a European senate
What should a senate do or be able to do? Its powers should obviously be 
related to its function, it would be counter-productive were a senate to stand 
loose from its purpose. Namely that of consolidating and enhancing the role 
and effect of national parliaments at European level in order to bolster the 
EU’s democratic legitimacy. 
30 Cf Aroney, Federal Constitutionalism/European Constitutionalism in Comparative Per-
spective, in X. (ed), Getuigend Staatsrecht: Liber Amicorum A.K. Koekkoek (2005) 229–251; 
Schütze, Co-operative Federalism Constitutionalised: The Emergence of Complementary Com-
petences in the EC Legal Order, 31 European Law Review (2006) 167–184, on the institu-
tional characterisation of the EU.
31 Especially as the Commission may initiate legislative proposals, while the relation 
between the Council and European Parliament has itself been characterised as bi-cameral 
without the addition of a senate even having been considered. Cf Groß, Zwei-Kammer-Par-
lamente in der Europäischen Union (note 13) 50–56; Couwenberg, Bicameralism – Historical 
Background, Alternative Conceptions and Current Relevance (note 15) 145.
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A senate’s powers must clearly amount to an added value and not simply 
a duplicated value. Do its powers lead to the conclusion that it fulfils a differ-
ent function to other organs, or does it amount to more of the same as it were 
without altering the situation? This is why senates, as mentioned, are gener-
ally chambers of reflection and revision, they hold the legislative process to 
account, instead of actively initiating the process.32 Senates are often designed 
to ensure the quality of the thought underlying proposed legislation and its 
possible impact, they essentially allow for the reconsideration of proposals 
and for the air to clear before finally coming to a decision. A good example 
in this regard would be the House of Lords in the United Kingdom, which 
can delay legislation, but cannot prevent its adoption.33
This argument implies that senates ought not have full or equal powers 
when compared to other legislative organs for fear of needless duplication. 
But not such a lack of power that sees it sidelined, thereby forsaking its func-
tion. This then also carries the gist of the main criticism levelled at bi-cam-
eralism in Italy, both houses of parliament enjoy identical powers, thereby 
often leading to a needless ping-pong match and unnecessary deadlock, in-
stead of ensuring meaningful addition to the legislative process.34 This is 
why constitutional designers often choose for senates to adopt a backseat, yet 
critical role when they participate in the legislative process and hold the 
executive to account. Yet, a senate must enjoy sufficient power to fulfil its 
function, although its function will usually be different from that of the 
other chamber or chambers it governs with. Symmetry of power should then 
be taken to mean enough power to meaningfully fulfil its function, what we 
can call real symmetry, instead of simply amounting to powers that are identi-
cal, what we can call formal symmetry. 
This is exactly the measure to be used in determining the nature and 
extent of a European Senate’s powers. It would be a waste of time and re-
sources to create a chamber or organ that already exists, in other words 
simply repeating the Council of Ministers, European Parliament or Commis-
sion. What is called for is innovation not repetition. 
To be honest though, it must be recognised that national parliaments are 
not completely left out in the cold at present.35 However, their influence, or 
power, can only be characterised as indirect and of an advisory nature, instead 
of direct and binding. For example, an assizes, or gathering, took place in 1990 
between the European Parliament and national parliaments in order to dis-
32 Knippenberg, De Senaat: Rechtsvergelijkend Onderzoek naar het House of Lords, de 
Sénat, de Eerste Kamer en de Bundesrat (note 23) 4.
33 Cf Russell, Reforming the House of Lords (note 14) 12.
34 Cf Russell, Reforming the House of Lords (note 14) 139-140.
35 Cf Kiiver, The National Parliaments in the European Union (note 1) 15-18; Raunio/
Wiberg, Does Support Lead to Ignorance? National Parliaments and the Legitimacy of EU 
Governance (note 8) 147–149.
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cuss the future of Europe. The idea of such gatherings was also included in 
Declaration 14, albeit non-binding, to the Final Act of the Intergovernmen-
tal Conference related to political unity, which eventually lead to the Treaty 
of Maastricht in 1992. A further declaration, also non-binding, similarly 
envisaged a greater role for national parliaments in holding the Community 
to account. Declaration 13 emphasised that national parliaments had to have 
greater access to EU documentation in order to aid ex ante scrutiny, although 
no time limits were set. In 1997 the ideas contained in Declaration 13 were 
formalised and became legally binding through the ‘Protocol on the role of 
national parliaments in the European Union’, which was attached to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. National parliaments were granted a minimum of six 
weeks to scrutinise EU legislative proposals. However, the idea of regular 
gatherings, such as the Assizes of 1990, was not repeated. Instead Part II of 
the Protocol recognised the Conference of Community and European Affairs 
Committees (COSAC), which has been meeting twice yearly since 1989 and 
consists of national delegations and a delegation of the European Parliament 
that act as a forum for the exchange of information and which issues non-
binding statements. The trend of enhancing the role of national parliaments 
was carried through to the First Protocol of the Constitutional Treaty, which 
reaffirmed the right to information enjoyed by national parliaments when it 
comes to receiving EU documentation so as to assist them in controlling their 
governments.36 
Groundbreaking though was the idea, also in the First Protocol, of grant-
ing national parliaments the power to test the subsidiarity of European 
legislative proposals.37 As mentioned, such proposals have to be sent to na-
36 According to Art 1-8 of the First Protocol, Commission consultation documents (green 
and white papers and communications) shall be forwarded directly by the Commission to 
national parliaments upon publication. The Commission shall also forward the annual legisla-
tive programme as well as any other instrument of legislative planning or policy to national 
parliaments, at the same time as to the European Parliament and the Council. Furthermore, 
draft European legislative acts sent to the European Parliament and to the Council shall be 
forwarded to national parliaments. The agendas for and the outcome of meetings of the Coun-
cil, including the minutes of meetings where the Council is deliberating on draft European 
legislative acts, shall be forwarded directly to national parliaments, at the same time as to 
member states’ governments. And finally, the Court of Auditors shall forward its annual report 
to national parliaments, for information, at the same time as to the European Parliament and 
to the Council.
37 The 2nd para of Art 5 of the EC Treaty expresses the subsidiarity principle: ‘In areas 
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in ac-
cordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of 
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.’ It is also 
laid down in Art I-11, Sec 3, of the Constitutional Treaty. For discussion of the principle in 
the EU-context, cf Dehousse, Does Subsidiarity Really Matter? (1993); Estella, The EU Prin-
ciple of Subsidiarity and its Critique (2002).
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tional parliaments, which can then review whether a proposal honours the 
principle of subsidiarity. Each national parliament is allocated two votes, or 
one vote for each chamber in bi-cameral parliaments. If a third of all votes 
reject a proposal with clear motivation for violating the principle of sub-
sidiarity, the proposal must be reconsidered. This becomes only a fourth of 
all votes if the proposal is submitted by the Commission or a fourth of mem-
ber states in accordance with article III-264 regarding freedom, security and 
justice. The initiator responsible for the proposal, be it the Commission, 
member states, European Parliament, Court of Justice, European Central 
Bank or the European Investment Bank must reconsider the proposal and 
may decide to retain, amend or withdraw the proposal, provided it motivates 
its stance. However, as the Constitutional Treaty has been defeated in the 
French and Dutch national referenda, thereby casting doubt on its future, it 
may be questioned when or whether anything will come of the proposals. 
Barroso, the current president of the Commission, has indicated his favour 
though in granting national parliaments the power to test for subsidiarity 
irrespective of the status of the Constitutional Treaty.38 
Nonetheless, the proposed reform would function within the usual con-
struction of double legitimacy. Although national parliaments would be 
granted a somewhat more direct role, they are arguably still very much por-
trayed as spectators or outsiders who can attract some attention, but who can 
do very little else. This construction does not officially recognise national 
parliaments as the third mainstay of European democracy. Not only may their 
envisaged role be too remote, their power to test legislative proposals for 
subsidiarity would still be non-binding; thereby, leaving national parlia-
ments not much better off from where they started, institutions with essen-
tially indirect and non-binding influence. 
Whereas institutionalising, consolidating and expanding the power of 
national parliaments by means of a senate could serve to increase parliaments’ 
direct and binding participation, not to mention increase the EU’s democratic 
credentials. Yet, as explained, the touchstone for such a body’s powers would 
have to be real symmetry aimed at its purpose of reflection and control, and 
not simply formal symmetry that would confuse its function. It would then 
arguably be a good idea to empower such a senate to effect control over the 
subsidiarity of legislative proposals, as foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty, 
while not allowing it to initiate legislation. The benefit being that national 
parliaments would so be accorded an organised and institutional voice at 
European level, but essentially in the role of national watchdog and not as 
supra-national initiator of legislation – a power common and essential to Euro-
pean organs in the strict sense of the word. This would be a good example 
38 Speech held by Barroso, President of the European Commission, at the joint parliamen-
tary meeting on the ‘Future of Europe’ on 9 May 2006.
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of healthy incongruence, by carving a niche for national parliaments without 
simply duplicating the function of other organs. Moreover, national parlia-
ments represented in a senate could be strengthened in their role as watchdog 
by making it more difficult to override their objections to legislative propos-
als. In other words, incorporating a senate as an actual and real cog in the 
legislative process, but then in the role of reflection chamber, instead of active 
participant in bringing about legislation. For instance, it could be required 
that the organs responsible for adopting legislation would have to follow a 
more difficult procedure to adopt a proposal about which the senate had 
doubts as to its subsidiarity.39 A senate would then not be able to give a 
suspensive veto, but not an absolute veto. This would allow for it to question 
legislative proposals, but would at the same time allow for deadlocks to be 
resolved. Simply put, an additional democratic check, but then with a decid-
edly national flavour without derailing or frustrating the supra-national 
process as such. In this way the legislative process can be slowed down in 
order to allow for reflection, while also increasing its democratic input by 
forging a link with national representatives.
As a matter of fact, it may also be questioned why a senate should only 
exercise power in respect of the subsidiarity of legislative proposals, and not 
also in respect of proportionality.40 Not only would national parliaments then 
exercise control over the fact whether the EU assumed too much power, test-
ing for subsidiarity in other words, but also on how the EU chooses to exer-
cise its power, in other words in a proportional or disproportional way. This 
could have as positive consequence that the national level and supra-na-
tional level turn, or roughly turn, at the same speed when it comes to evalu-
ating proportionality, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of EU legislation 
when it is to be implemented by national authorities.
As the aim is making the powers of national parliaments more direct and 
binding at European level, the question raises why this should only be in 
respect of legislative functions and not also in respect of executive functions? For 
example, why should a senate of national parliaments only exercise control 
over the Commission in respect of its legislative proposals, but not also in 
the way it executes its powers or is composed?
At present the President of the Commission is nominated by the Euro-
pean Council of Ministers and confirmed by the European Parliament.41 The 
President then nominates candidates as Commissioners, after which the Eu-
39 E.g. Peters, National Parliaments and Subsidiarity: Think Twice, 1 European Consti-
tutional Law Review (2005) 72, also suggests a qualified majority, for example two thirds, in 
order to overturn the national parliaments’ veto.
40 Art 5, para 3 of the EC Treaty reads: ‘Any action by the Community shall not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.’ Cf Emiliou, The Principle 
of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative Study (1996).
41 Art 214 of the EC Treaty.
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ropean Parliament has to confirm the nominees as a group. The role set aside 
for national parliaments is therefore quite marginal. They can in theory influ-
ence their governments when it comes to the nominations they put forward, 
which is once again a decidedly indirect and advisory role. It is perfectly 
plausible that a senate could be given the same powers as the European Par-
liament in confirming the nomination of the President and his or her Com-
missioners. In this way national parliaments are not allowed to usurp the role 
of the European Parliament, as the directly elected voice of Europeans, but 
are themselves not sidelined in the process. This construction would also 
serve to enable national parliaments to speak for themselves. This is impor-
tant, as parliaments are often more controlled by their governments than the 
other way round, making a mockery of parliamentary scrutiny of government 
input where Europe is concerned.42 The flipside of the coin being that na-
tional parliaments should then also be given the power to censure the Com-
mission, similar to the European Parliament.43 It would make little sense for 
it to confirm nominations only then to be excluded from exercising any 
control over the very Commissioners it supported. Real symmetry would argu-
ably coincide with formal symmetry in allowing national parliaments to scru-
tinise and control nominations to the Commission through a senate empow-
ered to exercise the power of censure.
The above powers of a possible senate would fit well with its purpose, 
namely ensuring a more direct and binding role for national parliaments at 
European level, thereby augmenting the EU’s democratic legitimacy, but 
without usurping existing structures. The idea would be to integrate na-
tional parliaments in the working of Europe, but with the emphasis on their 
exercising control and scrutiny from close quarters, instead of having them 
directing the process at the cost of better equipped European structures or 
allowing them to frustrate Europe without point.
It should be clear by now that not only must a delicate balance be struck 
as to the powers of a senate, but so must an even more delicate balance be 
struck as to its structure and composition to ensure that the vision of a sen-
ate does not simply float between good intentions and theory. The next sec-
tion will address this very topic, what should a senate look like, and why?
VI. Composition of a European senate
It should be clear by now that a European Senate should bring an added 
value to European democracy. It would not be meaningful to introduce such 
42 Brown, National Parliaments in the Convention on the Future of Europe, paper 31/03, 
http://fedtrust.co.uk 
43 Cf Corbett/Jacobs/Shackleton, The European Parliament6 (2005) 271–273, on the power 
of censure.
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an institution were it not to have a notable and worthwhile impact on Eu-
ropean decision-making processes. One of the lessons drawn from the discus-
sion of bi-cameralism above was that in terms of composition such an added 
value means that a senate may not be composed in an identical manner to 
the lower house. This would be valid not just in terms of mere numbers of 
seats or even the political colouring of those seats, but also with regard to 
the mechanism by which they are elected. In other words, an effective senate 
entails a measure of incongruence when it comes to its composition. Applied 
to the discussion we could say that a European Senate can only provide an 
additional third line of legitimacy if it has its own distinct power base. If its 
function is to embody an added value, its composition should reflect that 
function.
Several writers and commentators have pointed at existing European in-
stitutions and fora that could take on the function of a European Senate. The 
Council of Ministers has been suggested in this respect, but it does not fit 
our profile, simply because it does not represent national parliaments, but 
national governments.44 Therefore, it would not strengthen the legitimacy 
of European democracy by extending its base, as it would simply amount to 
reconfigurating existing EU structures. 
COSAC has also been mentioned as a possible European Senate, most 
notably in a report by the French Senate in 1999. This forum, which consists 
of six members of each national parliament and six representatives from the 
European Parliament, although recognised in the ‘Protocol on the role of the 
national parliaments in the European Union’ attached to the Treaty of Am-
sterdam, has no official status as an EU institution. It would nonetheless be 
possible to transform COSAC into such an institution, simultaneously grant-
ing it explicit powers regarding the EU’s legislative procedures. However, 
such an institution would not fit our profile of a European Senate very well. 
It would not be a permanent institution, but only a periodically convening 
forum, as the French Senate Report also suggested.45 It would be quite dif-
ficult though to perceive how such an institution could make a notable im-
pact on European decision-making processes. For similar reasons, a Conven-
tion including representatives of national parliaments, such as the one con-
vened to debate a constitution for Europe, or an Assizes of the national and 
European parliaments, which was convened in 1990 as a prelude to the 
Maastricht Treaty, is not suitable to serve as a European Senate either. 
Giving effect to the envisaged powers of a European Senate, developed 
earlier in the discussion, requires a structural solution. Namely, a separate 
44 Cf Groß, Zwei-Kammer-Parlamente in der Europäischen Union (note 13) 50–56; 
Couwenberg, Bicameralism – Historical Background, Alternative Conceptions and Current 
Relevance (note 15) 145.
45 The Report suggested that such a body should have six sessions per year, each session 
lasting a day and a half.
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and permanent institution which has a distinct profile in relation to the 
existing organs, but then as the voice of national parliaments. That means 
one has to look beyond the existing institutions. So what should such a new 
European institution look like? Or rather, how should it be composed?
Numerous methods for the composition of senates can be found in par-
liamentary democracies.46 Firstly, there are senates appointed in some or 
other fashion. In Canada for example, the members of the Senate are ap-
pointed by the Governor General, on proposal of the Prime Minister. The 
Canadian Senate is generally characterised as enjoying low legitimacy, and 
consequently as being a rather weak senate, even though it has relatively 
strong formal powers. Its lack of legitimacy prevents it from using these 
powers in an effective way. However, appointed senates are not necessarily 
weak. Since 1958 the British House of Lords has consisted of hereditary peers 
and peers appointed for life, with an emphasis on life peers after the reforms 
of 1999. Appointments are made by the Crown, on proposal of the Prime 
Minister. The House of Lords also enjoys relatively low legitimacy as its 
membership is either by appointment or hereditary succession, but is none-
theless characterised by a high level of political and professional experience, 
making it a relatively strong senate, which can have considerable impact on 
the legislative process.47 The Federal Council of Germany (German Bun-
desrat) is also an example of an appointed senate, but it differs from the 
Canadian and British senates in one major respect. The Bundesrat is not ap-
pointed by the Federal President or Chancellor, but its members are selected 
from and by the governments of the Länder or federal regions. In other words, 
a ‘bottom up’ style appointed senate representative of regional governments, 
as opposed to the Canadian and British senates that are appointed by the 
central governments in a ‘top down’ fashion. 
A form of ‘top down’ appointment is no realistic option as a mechanism 
for composing a European Senate. Who should be granted the authority to 
appoint the senators? The European Commission, Council of Ministers, or 
perhaps the European Council? Such a senate would be appointed by the very 
institutions it should seek to control, meeting with the same criticism regard-
ing the lack of legitimacy as the British and Canadian examples. Further-
more, a senate should be independent from other EU institutions and, as 
argued here, serve to represent national parliaments. In order to do this, it 
must have its power base in those national parliaments. A consequence of 
this conclusion is that the German variance of ‘bottom up’ appointment will 
not suffice for a European Senate. Such a system would grant the appointment 
power to national governments, and not to national parliaments. 
46 Cf Russell, Reforming the House of Lords (note 14) 29–32.
47 Knippenberg, De Senaat: Rechtsvergelijkend Onderzoek naar het House of Lords, de 
Sénat, de Eerste Kamer en de Bundesrat (note 23) 97–103; Shell, The House of Lords and the 
Thatcher Government, Parliamentary Affairs 1985, 16–32.
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Another problem would be presented were a senate to be composed 
through direct elections. A situation would so be created whereby a senate is 
identical, or at least very similar, in terms of its composition to the existing 
European Parliament. There are examples of such senates, for example Italy 
and Spain have senates which are composed, at least for the largest part, in 
a way similar to that of the lower house.48 In Spain, both houses of parliament 
are directly elected, though not in an identical way, a majoritarian system is 
followed for the Senate, while the lower house is elected on a proportional 
basis. But in both countries, the senate has a limited impact on the demo-
cratic process.49 Similarly, a directly elected senate would not have a distinct 
added value in terms of legitimacy, as it negates the lesson taught that in-
congruence serves to enhance a body’s legitimacy by providing it with its 
own base.
An indirectly elected European Senate is conceivable though. National par-
liaments could be granted the power, after national parliamentary elections 
have taken place, to elect the members of a European Senate to represent their 
interests at European level. This would certainly meet the requirement of 
incongruence as regards to composition. This being the case as the Council 
of Ministers is designated by national governments and the European Parlia-
ment is directly elected by Europeans, while a European Senate would be 
indirectly elected by national parliaments. Care must be taken though in 
ensuring that in electing such a senate the voices of national parliaments do 
not get lost in the process. Some indirectly elected senates, such as those of 
the Netherlands and Ireland do not act as strong regional voices. Such senates 
then have to be justified in terms of their function as reflection chamber alone, 
and not also in terms of regional representation. As to a European Senate, the 
ideal balance would be struck by designing a chamber that allows room not 
only for reflection, but one that takes note of territorial representation.
In this regard, the South African National Council of Provinces (NCOP) 
poses an interesting model for a European Senate.50 The NCOP consist of 90 
members, ten for each of South Africa’s nine provinces. Of each group of ten 
representatives, six are permanent, and four are special delegates. The per-
manent members are designated by the provincial legislature, the four special 
delegates are the provincial prime minister, and three other members of the 
48 Prakke/Kortmann (eds), Constitutional Law of 15 EU Member States (2004) 495–499, 
757–763.
49 Cf Russell, Reforming the House of Lords (note 14) 150–151.
50 Art 60–62 of the South African Constitution (1996). Rautenbach/Malherbe, Constitu-
tional Law4 (2004) 124–125; Malherbe, The South African National Council of Provinces: 
Trojan Horse or White Elephant, Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg/Journal of South 
African Law 1998, 77–96; Murray/Nijzink, Building Representative Democracy: South Afri-
ca’s Legislatures and the Constitution (Parliamentary Support Programme 2002) 41–58; 
Murray/Simeon, From Paper to Practice: The National Council of Provinces After its First Year, 
19 SA Public Law (1999) 96–141.
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legislature, all three designated by the legislature.51 The delegates can also 
be members of the provincial executives, as they retain the membership of 
their provincial legislatures. The special delegates are designated in service 
of the specific expertise wanted in the NCOP at a given moment. Part of the 
inspiration for this construction is the German Bundesrat, but there is a 
significant difference: not the provincial governments, but the legislatures 
– the provincial parliaments – appoint the members of the NCOP. 
A European Senate based on the South African model would have the 
advantage of providing a structural solution, in the sense that it would be a 
permanent institution, consisting of members of national parliaments, which 
would at the same time be perfectly shaped to equip itself with the specific 
expertise needed to provide scrutiny in various policy areas. Providing for 
permanent delegates with both a European and national mandate would 
ensure continuity and a steady link with national institutions. While the 
special delegate construction would allow members of national parliaments 
to be involved in the European democratic process without burdening them 
with a permanent double mandate, but only on occasion when their opinions 
or expertise is needed in the senate. This would be an ideal way in which to 
address the concern, as also expressed by the EU Select Committee of the 
House of Lords, that a permanent double mandate for all delegates would 
lead to a very difficult if not impossible workload.52 While also meeting the 
need identified by the French Senate, namely that Europe lacks the direct 
and visible input of prominent national parliamentarians, which could only 
serve to strengthen the legitimacy of European decision-making.53 
As a matter of fact, such a construction would not be a complete novelty 
within the institutional structure of the EU. For example, the proposed 
model is reflected to some extent in the composition of the Council of Min-
isters, which is also an institution with a variable composition that is deter-
mined by the policy issues at hand. In addition, members of the European 
Parliament were not directly elected until 1979, but also designated by their 
national parliaments. Furthermore, double mandates were standard until that 
time, and still possible today. However, the construction is quite rare and 
discouraged even to the extent that some member states, such as Italy, do 
not allow simultaneous membership of their national parliaments and the 
European Parliament.54
This is where the added value of a European Senate constructed along the 
lines of permanent and special delegates becomes particularly clear. The di-
rectly elected members of the European Parliament can be allowed to devote 
51 Art 60–62 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996).
52 A Second Parliamentary Chamber for Europe (note 2) part 4 (no 30).
53 A European Second Chamber (note 2).
54 Cf Van de Meerssche, Van Jalta tot Malta: Politieke Geschiedenis van Europa (1990) 
188–190. 
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their full attention and mandates to Europe, whereas an indirectly elected 
senate can be allowed to control Europe while not leading to excessive work-
loads for its members. National specialists on Europe can be given permanent 
double mandates, while special delegates can be appointed where and as 
needed.
But how should national parliaments be represented in a senate, and how 
should its voting be organised? Should national parliaments be afforded equal 
representation or proportional representation based on population numbers? 
As the idea is it to provide national parliaments with a voice it would seem 
logical to opt for representation based on parity and not proportionality, 
similar to the United States Senate. In this way all parliaments can have a 
say, thereby ensuring that smaller states do not have to be fearful of being 
drowned out. This will also ensure desired incongruency, as the principle of 
proportionality is respected in composing the European Parliament, while 
equal representation is also done justice, thereby allowing a distinct route of 
democratic legitimation to be developed. This does not mean to say though 
that equal representation may not be tempered somewhat, for example by 
allowing larger states twenty votes and smaller states ten votes, along the 
lines of the German Bundesrat.55 As long as the national parliaments of 
smaller states are not marginalised completely, as the proportional division 
of votes between Germany and Malta would have as effect. 
Further as to representation, it would be apt for member states to decide 
themselves how to allocate their allotted votes in a senate to their national 
parliaments. For instance, bi-cameral parliaments, such as France, must be 
allowed to decide if and how their votes are to be divided between the cham-
bers. While federal states, such as Belgium, should be able to decide wheth-
er the term ‘national parliaments’ includes votes being allotted federal ter-
ritories and not only the federal parliament. 
The same would go for voting procedures in a European Senate. States 
must be allowed to decide whether their senators must cast their votes as a 
group, in other words ten votes in favour or against, or whether senators may 
cast individual ballots. This would allow a uni-cameral parliament, such as 
that of Denmark, to speak with a unified voice, if it so desired, whereas bi-
cameral parliaments or federal states would be allowed to account for differ-
ent chambers or regions to state their views at European level.
In essence, composing a European Senate must be alive to the fact that it 
must strive for incongruence in relation to other European institutions, es-
pecially the European Parliament, in allowing national parliaments to be 
given a direct and distinct voice in making triple legitimacy a reality.
55 According to Art 51 of the German Basic Law (1949) each Land has between 3 and 6 
members in the Bundesrat, depending on its number of inhabitants. Cf Prakke/Kortmann (eds), 
Constitutional Law of 15 EU Member States (note 48) 332.
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VII. Conclusion
We believe that there are strong arguments in favour of the introduction of 
a European Senate. Such an institution would be a significant and meaning-
ful addition to the EU institutional structure, as it would serve to strength-
en the legitimacy of European democracy in the face of its democratic deficit 
– especially after the referenda rebellions against the Constitutional Treaty. 
A direct and binding involvement of national parliaments in European deci-
sion-making would provide a much desired third line of legitimacy. This 
then by expanding the usual and dated construction of double legitimacy 
based on the European Parliament and the involvement of national govern-
ments through the Council of Ministers.
A European Senate would also be the ideal vehicle with which to add 
tangible and organised value to parliamentary scrutiny within the EU. This 
would serve to improve the quality of European legislation and governance, 
but it would also be a crucial institution on a more abstract level. It could 
serve as a mechanism to represent both national interests at the European 
level and European interests at the national level by bringing national par-
liamentarians more in contact with Europe. 
In designing such a body special inspiration can be drawn from bi-cam-
eral legislatures when it pertains to its powers and composition. More con-
cretely from the example set by the South African second chamber, the 
NCOP. The NCOP provides us with a promising model with which to shape 
a European Senate, as it would allow for a wide involvement of national 
parliamentarians at the European level by providing a continuous link be-
tween national parliaments and Europe, while at the same time providing 
the expertise needed at any given moment.
In essence, a European Senate, properly conceptualised and designed, 
would go a long way towards the ideal expressed by Joschka Fischer, then 
German Minister of Foreign Affairs, in May 2000 that the EU should be: ‘A 
Europe of nation-states and a Europe of citizens.’56
Zusammenfassung
Die beiden Autoren plädieren für die Gründung eines Europäischen Senats: 
Solch eine Institution würde eine signifikante und bedeutungsvolle Ergän-
zung zur institituionellen Strukture in der EU darstellen; als es dazu dient 
die Legitimität der Europäischen Demokratie, angesichts ihres Demokratie-
defizits zu stärken; insbesonders nach der Rebellion qua den Referenden 
56 Fischer, From Confederacy to Federation – Thoughts on the Finality of European Inte-
gration, speech held at Humboldt University in Berlin on 12 May 2000.
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gegen den Verfassungsvertrag. Eine direkte und bindende Beteiligung von 
nationalen Parlamenten an der europäischen Entscheidungsfindung würde 
eine viel geforderte dritte Linie der Legitimität liefern. Dies sodann durch 
Expansion der üblichen und überholten Konstruktion von doppelter Recht-
mäßigkeit, basierend auf dem Europäischen Parlament und der Beteiligung 
von nationalen Regierungen durch den Ministerrat. Ein europäischer Senat 
wäre auch das ideale Vehikel, mit dem ein materieller und organisierter Wert 
zur parlamentarischer Prüfung innerhalb der EU hinzugefügt wird. Dies 
würde dazu dienen, die Qualität von europäischen Gesetzen und der Verwal-
tung zu verbessern, aber es wäre auch eine entscheidende Institution auf einer 
abstrakteren Ebene. Es könnte als Mechanismus dienen, um beides zu re-
präsentieren, nationale Interessen am europäischen Level und europäischen 
Interessen am nationalen Level; dadurch, indem nationale Parlamentarier 
mehr in Kontakt mit Europa gebracht werden. Beim Gestalten solch einer 
Institution kann spezielle Inspiration von der bikameralen Gesetzgebung 
geschöpft werden, wenn es um deren Kräfte und deren Komposition geht. 
Konkreter am Beispiel der südafrikanischen zweiten Kammer, des National 
Council of Provinces (Nationaler Provinzenrat). Das NCOP liefert uns ein 
vielversprechendes Modell, mit dem ein europäischer Senat zu formen ist, da 
es eine breite Beteiligung von nationalen Parlamentariern auf europäischem 
Level ermöglicht, indem eine fortlaufende Verbindung zwischen nationalen 
Parlamenten und Europa vorgesehen ist, während zu derselben Zeit jederzeit 
die erforderliche Sachkenntnis liefert. Im Kern, regelrecht konzeptualisiert 
und gestaltet, würde ein europäischer Senat einen langen Weg in Richtung 
des vom ehemaligen deutschen Außenminister Joschka Fischer im Mai 2000 
ausgedrückten Ideals gehen, das die EU sein sollte: Ein Europa von Natio-
nalstaaten und ein Europa von Bürgern.
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